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Summary Critique

TASK FORCE TRAINING PROGRAM

CLASS ONE

This document is part of an integrated file. If separated from the file it must be subjected to individual systematic review.

I. BACKGROUND

In furtherance of the recognized need for improving the manpower operational capability of members of the CIA/Contingency Force (CF) to be in readiness to cope with Covert Limited Warfare (CLW) situations, it was mutually agreed between the DD/P and the DTR that an effort should be made to develop a training program especially designed to serve this purpose.

On 18 March 1960, the DTR concurred in a training program circulated by the DD/P to principal Clandestine Services components which established a quota to be filled from their respective CF members or nominees and set the training period for 2-19 May 1960.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF TRAINING PROGRAM

A. Student Candidates -

Clandestine Services: It was contemplated to form a typical task force operational group consisting of the normal balance of operational specialties. In order to minimize disruption of current operations an effort was made to distribute the student call among all the components. Of the 25 students desired all operating divisions responded to their quotas less WH and IO. The problem of making candidates available was sufficiently difficult owing to the pressure of current operations and ~~TEXT~~ was compounded by the fact that almost 15% of those proposed were rejected for medical reasons. The SR Division candidate was withdrawn after the first week. TSD could not make a candidate available. The Special Staffs, WPS and DPD complied with their quota requirements. It was unfortunate that no case officers were made available for this task force training. A senior officer, was assigned part time as an adviser during the field exercise though not as a participant of the operation. The Cable Secretariat and the C/RID cooperated considerably in making available selected personnel. One candidate was drawn from the DDI's office for intelligence analysis training.

Support Services: In order to provide training for the different support services and enable the class to obtain the characteristics of a typical task force group, the DDS was requested to make candidates

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available from the Logistics, Communications, Security, Medical, and Finance Divisions. The DTR, as co-sponsor of this program, agreed to make available three operationally qualified persons, in addition to the necessary instructors, support personnel and the facilities of Building [REDACTED] 25X1A6b

B. Curriculum -

The purpose of this special training program was studied in terms of availability of candidates and the time allotted. Within these limits it was determined to design the program in three parts or phases, each with the objectives as follows:

Phase One: Headquarters Briefings, 2-6 May 1960

"To provide members of the CF with an understanding of the CLW concept and DD/P's responsibilities as well as;
"To review certain case histories, provide guidance in task force planning, conduct of operations as relating to both operational and support doctrines".

Phase Two: Field Instruction, 9-13 May 1960

"To improve proficiencies in acquired basic skills by providing refresher training in these subjects and familiarizing the CF members with all the basic skills likely to be involved in a CLW task force situation".

Phase Three: Field Exercise "Operation [REDACTED]", 16-20 May 1960 25X1A2g

"To exercise command relationships and responsibilities between the Clandestine Services and Support Services as well as the intra aspects thereof;
"To provide field training for both operational and support personnel in task force operations;
"To test the operational doctrine of covert action operations in a task force situation;
"To test the support capabilities of the concerned support components in a task force situation;
"To determine the readiness of participating members of the CF to engage in field task force operations".

C. Preparations -

Phase One: A total of 26 different speakers had to be arranged for this period of instruction. While most of the speakers complied with the request to tailor their subjects to meet the specific purpose of the training, last minute changes resulted in some briefings that were not particularly suitable for this kind of program. The scope of this week's training was so broad and generally new or undeveloped that it was considered desirable to schedule a lecture for each working hour of the day. The only classroom available was in Building [REDACTED] Room 155. 25X1A

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Phase Two: The OTR accepted responsibility for this period of field instruction at [REDACTED]. The only difficulty encountered was inherent in the nature of the training as refresher, familiarization and cross-training in so many subjects simply did not permit, nor was it desired, that each subject be treated in implicit detail.

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Phase Three: Though the initial meeting with DDS components for planning for this program was held on 21 March 1960, it was not determined until about 25 April, exactly what kind of quarters could be made available at [REDACTED] for the field exercise. It was initially thought that it would be necessary to quarter all elements in tents. The Logistics Division endeavored to provide tentage and was unable to do so without purchasing them. OTR re-examined the problem and found it was possible to make available several condemned buildings for this purpose. Despite the full cooperation of the Logistics personnel, OTR was called on to provide most all of the logistical support for this training.

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Though the program received its approval on 18 March 1960, there were only two officers available full time to make all the necessary arrangements within OTR and the Clandestine Services, including students, lecturers, logistics and planning. It was contemplated that the field exercise maneuver plan would be ready for staffing and distribution by 15 April 1960. Although these officers, one from OTR [REDACTED] and the other from CA/ [REDACTED] received excellent cooperation and assistance from all concerned, they were unable to complete the maneuver plan "Operation [REDACTED]" in the desired time. The bulk of the plan was distributed at the beginning of phase one and it was necessary to provide additional sections as the training progressed.

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III. CRITIQUE OF THE PROGRAM

A. Phase One -

Concept: The one hour of study of the CLW concept paper did not appear to be adequate for comprehension as the student critiques indicated a number of them were not able fully to intrepret this concept throughout the course. It is believed, as suggested by the students, that this concept not only be given for studying but that more time be allowed for open discussion of its contents and possible applications.

PM Doctrine: The working draft of "Paramilitary Aspects of Covert Action" was distributed for reading the first day. The "Operation [REDACTED]" plan was prepared on the basis of this doctrine as related to the CLW concept paper. Judging from several of the student

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critiques, it is apparent that they either had not studied the doctrine or read the plan carefully enough to note that it was intended to demonstrate in the plan how readily CIA could generate a tactical operation against an unfriendly government when adequate, long-range preparations had been made in advance of

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three year period based upon the doctrinal approach, taking it through the cycle of situations one and two, CLW concept. As in the case of the CLW concept, it is believed this doctrine paper should be given adequate time for discussion with the lecturer pointing out its relevancy to the maneuver plan.

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High Level Addresses: The talks by Messrs. Bissell, White and [REDACTED], regarding their respective concern with this subject were all very well received and went a long ways toward providing the proper perspective on the importance of developing this readiness capability. A few students felt it would have been better if these officials opened the course and permitted a few minutes for discussion should there be any pertinent questions in the minds of the students.

Policies: Several students rightfully called attention to the absence of any briefings on the national and Agency policies bearing on CLW situations. It is believed that this should be done in the future.

Case Histories: While those selected for presentation were generally well received and considered very interesting, many students felt each one had been brushed over too lightly. The suggestion was made that only one case history be given and this should be as fully described as possible with time for the students to discuss it in detail. PBSUCCESS was suggested for this purpose, downgrading it to "Secret".

Task Force Planning, etc.: There was considerable interest in the planning and conduct of task force operations. It was suggested that these subjects be treated more fully next time.

Functional Operations: Generally, the lectures on intelligence, counterintelligence, psychological, [REDACTED] and paramilitary operational plans, were not sufficiently tailored to the specific requirements of a task force operation nor were they concerned with planning, per se. In the next course, greater attention should be given to these subjects, preferably by the senior staff components concerned and should include economic warfare. The clandestine radio lecture was excellent and should be given separately from a lecture on propaganda operational planning.

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Support Services: From the experience gained in Operation [REDACTED] it is believed that each support component would be able to provide more meaningful briefings on the planning of their respective services. The need for more time and extensive treatment of communications, especially new and different forms of communications, is considered very important.

Training Support: The excellent material presented by the OTR exceeded the time allotted. It is believed a specially prepared lecture should be designed which would provide specific guidance for task force personnel in how to plan and implement their training problems involving foreign personnel and what services and facilities may be drawn upon.

General: This phase of training fulfilled the established objectives. However, if the above suggestions are given consideration in the next course it is believed this period will be even more valuable to the student. The classroom assigned was not satisfactory from a ventilation point of view. Though the 40 hours of lectures was burdensome, the students felt the need for even more substantive treatment of the material. With more time to prepare the lectures, more extensive use of visual aids, fewer coffee breaks, a later starting time in the morning and more time for discussion as a result of more concise treatment of the material, these 40 hours could be highly productive and more easily absorbed by the students.

B. Phase Two -

Physical Training: Knowing the pace and the living conditions in the third phase would be arduous, OTR was requested to provide an instructor for 15 minutes of physical exercise before breakfast for all who cared to participate. Unfortunately the instructor did not recognize either the age or the condition of the students and, though most volunteered at the start, it was necessary to cancel this training as it was too strenuous. It is believed the need for and the desire for this training justifies its consideration in the next course. However, the instructor should be guided by the assigned task force medical officer as to the nature and the manner of such training.

Basic Map and Compass: While most students considered the initial films as too elementary before the last one was shown many were becoming confused. It is believed that this period of instruction invariably will bore some of the students some of the time but most certainly will prove beneficial for all

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students to be re-exposed to these fundamentals to ensure they know them. It would probably be better to have the instructor review the fundamentals of maps in about ten minutes, deleting the first film and thereby have more time at the end to thoroughly review the major grid coordinate systems.

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Logistical Air Support: Many agreed that the [REDACTED] presentation was excellent. However, a critique by one of the student's is believed to have merit. The principles and administration of [REDACTED] should be given at the Headquarter's briefings as part of the logistics course and in the field, actual packs should be demonstrated to the students. This should be followed by examination and familiarization with the weapons involved. To be more orderly, this particular subject should follow instruction in air supply drops.

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Air Operations: Again, while well done, many students thought this should have been followed up by having the students form into teams and actually lay on and receive air deliveries.

Weapons: Most students recognized the need to re-familiarize themselves in the actual handling of different small weapons. However, some students felt that it was too informal, and perhaps, should have adhered more closely to range discipline procedures of the military. As stated above, it would have been more meaningful to have had the students work with the specific weapons included in the [REDACTED] packs.

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[REDACTED] While there was insufficient time for detailed instruction it was considered an excellent opportunity for the students to become familiar with the [REDACTED] available and their applications. This instruction is desired for all Contingency Force personnel and no substantive changes are believed necessary.

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Resistance: This was an excellent lecture and unquestionably valuable to the students. It probably would have been of even greater value if it had been more closely identified with the maneuver problem.

Guerrilla Warfare: Though this was an excellent, first hand account of guerrilla warfare, it reflected the need for development of training material specifically applicable to CIA's covert support of guerrilla operations in a CLW situation instead of a hot war situation as in this instance.

Ambush: The students generally objected to being caught by surprise during the ambush exercise and felt that the lesson involved could have been just as effective if they had been alerted to the possibility of an ambush.

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C. Phase Three -

1. Maneuver Plan - "Operation [REDACTED]"

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In the absence of any precedent for CIA war gaming a CLW situation, the experiences and techniques of the Army were studied and modified to fit the requirements of this training. The plan devised, had three dimensions of organization as follows:

Field Task Force - comprised of the students with a designated commander.

Maneuver Control Center - comprised of three moderators, representing the Clandestine Services, Office of Training and Office of Security, respectively.

Friendly Assets - consisting of three selected individuals (colored) from the Clandestine Services who were briefed to assume the role of P/A's under the direction of the moderators.

An actual problem country was selected, [REDACTED] and the prevailing situation was extrapolated three years hence. The operational developments were traced as if the paramilitary doctrine had been vigorously applied within an assumed [REDACTED] action operation. This was done to demonstrate how feasible [REDACTED] if [REDACTED] long range assets and mechanisms were built into the situation. While the given assets were generous it was not believed unreasonable if such a deliberate effort had been undertaken during this period. Moreover, it was desired to work into the problem the major operational activities likely to be involved: resistance, guerrilla warfare, defection and support services of air, maritime, logistics, security, etc.

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It was intended to demonstrate the complexity of such operations, the stresses and strains which occur under pressure, the need to do with what you have though it is less than desired. It was felt that exposure to such an operation, under adverse field conditions, with more to do than time would permit, would serve to demonstrate a certain amount of realism. In order to ensure the successful conclusion of the maneuver and its close control at all times, an hour by hour operational schedule was prepared and observed by both the Task Force Commander and the Maneuver Control Center, without the knowledge of the students.

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It was generally stated that the maneuver plan was adequately prepared to achieve the above and the objectives defined therein. Most students, however, felt the plan was so tightly integrated and contained so much that had to be carefully digested that it would have been better if the first week at Headquarters dealt with it in detail; and, the second week at [REDACTED] provided the basic field skills required to implement the plan.

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2. Play of the Maneuver - "Operation [REDACTED]"

This is summarized as pertaining to the "objectives" of the plan:

Command Relationships:

This was demonstrated in an excellent manner by the Task Force Commander and the senior, Support officer. The practical relationships and the exercise of command responsibilities which were carried out during this maneuver clearly indicated the healthy attitude that prevails between operational and support personnel and most important, that properly motivated, matured individuals can function together as a team under heavy pressure and adverse conditions.

Field Training in Task Force Operations:

It is well known that in a crash operation

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committed, many normal procedures must be abridged; only the most important things can be done at the moment; everyone must assume many tasks or other duties, specialists become generalists; and, in short, the pressures and inadequacies as well as discomfortures of such a situation must be expected and emulated if this kind of training is to be meaningful. It is believed that this was the case in Operation [REDACTED]. A number of improvised procedures were established as required. Though somewhat frustrated in having to do so, many operational decisions were made as the exigencies of the situation warranted. Almost every participant undertook unfamiliar tasks or other duties; the Commander typed his own cables and Logistics Officers assumed paramilitary duties, etc. There was some dismay over inadequate intelligence, communications choke-ups, etc., but these too were largely overcome. Only a very few actually complained of the adverse field conditions.

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~~SECRET~~Covert Action Operations:

Though predominantly a matter of covert action, this exercise provided an excellent demonstration of the vital importance of intelligence and counter-intelligence operations in such a situation. While not adequately played out during the maneuver, owing to the absence of [REDACTED] propaganda case officers, covert action per se was demonstrated as a three prong weapon merged almost into one effort involving [REDACTED] propaganda and paramilitary. The clandestine radio broadcast effort was sufficiently simulated to demonstrate the importance of this medium both for psychological and operational support activities. All of these FI-CI-CA operational functions were tightly integrated in the play of the maneuver and served to demonstrate their relative effectiveness when directed by one commander. A number of minor operational lessons were learned which should be brought in other training courses.

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Support Services:

Unquestionably this experience clearly brought home the importance of the support services to a task force operation and, conversely, it helped the support personnel concerned to gain an appreciation of the problems confronting operational personnel in such a situation. The [REDACTED] capability was well demonstrated in this exercise as well as the importance of detailed planning with the DPD. The Logistics Division saw the need for developing a fly-away task force kit and became intimately familiar with the kind of logistical support required in a task force operation.

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While the Communications Office provided all the communicators that could be spared and it was well recognized at the outset that this number would be insufficient, the overloading which occurred exceeded the anticipated volume and insufficient use was made of the couriers (P/A's) that were available. This experience also served to demonstrate the need for developing special instruction in communications discipline in a task force operation. Aside from failure to exercise tight control over cable traffic, a number of originators were unfamiliar with the use of field cryptonyms and interchanged them with official cryptonyms to the point of confusion.

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This and other irregularities demonstrates that the Clandestine Services should work jointly with the Office of Communications to develop corrective training material of common concern.

The Medical Officer contributed to the welfare of the group and so demonstrated the importance of having such a specialist on a task force operation. Circumstances did not permit the preparation of adequate ops data to enable the medical officer to simulate the development of an indigenous medical operational plan though this officer did illustrate how it could be done and its importance to this kind of an operation.

The plan did not involve the simulation of the financial annex. It is believed, however, that the Finance Officer participating in this course acquired sufficient grasp of the problem to be able to write in a more realistic financial play in the next maneuver.

The plan attempted to demonstrate the important role of Security in the advance preparations and in the actual conduct of the operation. The Security Officer assigned, however, was placed in the Maneuver Control Center where he was able to contribute to the play of the maneuver and acquire a full picture of all operations thus broadening his experience.

Readiness of Contingency Force Members:

Perhaps the most impressive aspect of this training was the manner in which the students, drawn from the entire Agency, most of them total strangers, quickly formed as a team and developed an excellent esprit de corps. A great deal of this was due to the personal leadership of the Task Force Commander. In addition, there was present a fine sense of individual dedication and a high degree of competency among the entire group. Both as a group and as individuals, they probably constituted as an outstanding task force as the Agency would be able to form for an actual operation. This is a tribute to the many supervisors who selected the candidates and the Agency, at large, that there would be so many outstanding employees, ready and able to participate in such an arduous undertaking.

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On the critical side the experience highlighted the following problems:

Physical Fitness: The disproportionate number of medically unqualified nominees, estimated about 15%, was considered somewhat alarming and served to re-emphasize the importance of having a Contingency Force mechanism to identify those physically qualified for unlimited service.

Age: While all performed well for the period of the maneuver, there were so many participants over forty years of age, one third in key positions, that consideration should be given to the likelihood that some of them would not be able to stand the pace over a very long period in an actual operation. This point serves to illustrate the need for developing more junior officers in the basic skills and providing more intermediate level officers with command or field supervisory experience in task force operations.

Cross-training: The lack of understanding of basic terms or language involved in each others specialities as well as techniques was apparent and high lighted the importance of stressing cross-training as much as possible.

Task Force Training: Despite the outstanding performance, as a group, it was clearly evident that training of this nature was highly desirable and that each individual is far better qualified than before for participation in a task force situation.

IV. PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS

- A. The general objectives of this training were satisfactorily realized.
- B. War gaming a CLW situation was demonstrated as feasible and worthwhile.
- C. Training in task force operations proved to be both a specialized field and an effective means of improving capability in this regard.

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D. Personnel made available for this training, generally evidenced a high degree of proficiency in the performance of their duties under pressure and adverse conditions.

E. Operational and support doctrines received a field testing which should prove of future value.

F. All participants undoubtedly benefited from the cross-training and intimate familiarization with the nature of task force operations.

G. Medical rejects, 15% of nominees, should be noted as a serious limitation on the availability of personnel for task force operations.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Training in task force operations should be established on an annual basis.

B. Class Two, Task Force Operations Familiarization Training Program, should be scheduled for three weeks in May 1961.

C. A task force training plans committee should be constituted and convened about November 1960, to revise the Class Two maneuver plan and schedule. This committee should be composed as follows:

Co-chairmen: Clandestine Services Representative (CA/PMG)
Support Services Representative (OTR [REDACTED])

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Following plans officers to participate as appropriate to their service and as required:

Clandestine Services: FI, CI, WPS, DPD, TSD,
CA/[REDACTED] CA/[REDACTED] CA/[REDACTED]
Support Services: Log., Commo., Security,
Medical, Finance, and Admin.

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
D. Arrangements should be made for obtaining military leave for this training and such announcement should be made about December 1960.

E. This training, to be effective, should be restricted to qualified personnel. Accordingly, the plans committee should commence formulation of selection lists for appropriate distribution by January 1961. Membership in the Contingency Force should be a prerequisite for this training.

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F. The plans committee should be guided by this summary critique and the specific student critiques attached hereto.

Prepared by:





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Attachments:

- Tab "A" - "Critique of Hdqs Briefings"
- Tab "B" - "Critique of Field Instruction"
- Tab "C" - "Critique of Maneuver Plan"
- Tab "D" - "Critique of the Play of the Maneuver"

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		8 Sept. 60
TO: <i>Office of Training</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
11		
REMARKS:		
<i>Betsy: 04860-7353</i> <i>The attached is</i> <i>forwarded per our</i> <i>telecon today -</i> 		
FROM: <i>O-SS/P Registry</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
1061	L	4794
<small>FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55</small> <small>REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.</small> <small>★ GPO : 1957 - O - 439445</small>		

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